Facebook and MySpace in the Courtroom: Authentication of Social Networking Websites by Mehlman, Julia
American University Criminal Law Brief 
Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 2 
2012 
Facebook and MySpace in the Courtroom: Authentication of 
Social Networking Websites 
Julia Mehlman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mehlman, Julia. "Facebook and MySpace in the Courtroom: Authentication of Social Networking 
Websites." American University Criminal Law Brief 8, no. 1 (2012): 9-28. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
Criminal Law Brief 9
Facebook and MySpace in the Courtroom:  
Authentication of Social Networking Websites
I. InTroducTIon
P
eople reveal their lives online. Since 2005,4 an 
entire generation has been archiving its daily, or even 
hourly, activities for hundreds of followers on social 
networking websites.5 Since then, users have continued 
to multiply, reaching people of all age groups.6 These sites7 
are “sophisticated tools of communication where the user 
voluntarily provides informa-
tion that the user wants to share 
with others.”8 Many of these 
sites, including Facebook—the 
“behemoth of the social network-
ing world”9—and MySpace, 
enable members “to create on-
line ‘profiles,’ which are in-
dividual web pages on which 
members post photographs, 
videos, and information about 
their lives and interests.”10 
Users connect by linking 
their profiles—becoming 
“friends”— joining similar fan 
pages, similar networks, “liking” 
similar things, and sharing 
content among their accounts.11
Although social networking websites have been hugely 
popular for some time, they are only beginning to find their place 
in the courtroom.12 Over the past few years, there has been “an 
ever increasing number of cases involving social networking 
communications, and these cases cover a broad range of areas of 
law.”13 Indeed, social networking websites come up at various 
stages of litigation, ranging from civil and criminal discovery,14 to 
problems with juries,15 to use as evidence at trial,16 to sentencing 
proceedings17 and beyond.
Although there are problems associated with the use 
of social networking websites at each of the aforementioned 
stages, this article focuses on the use of social networking 
websites as evidence at trial and the problems of authentication, 
particularly in criminal cases. The article will proceed in three 
parts. In Part II, this article will address the law of authentica-
tion in general, to provide a background for courts’ approaches 
to authenticating social networking websites. In Part III, this 
article will describe the different methodologies courts use to 
authenticate different aspects of 
social networking websites and 
will compare those approaches 
to existing case law about 
authenticating electronically 
stored information generally. 
It will begin by examining 
authentication of messages sent 
via social networking websites, 
and then it will analyze post-
ings, photographs, and “tags.” 
Finally, in Part IV, this article 
will conclude with a summary 
of the approaches, accompanied 
by some recommendations and 
strategies for courts and parties 
for authenticating this growing category of potential evidence.
In addressing the issues that arise with the authentication 
of information from social networking websites, most courts 
begin by looking at the general framework for authentication, 
focusing on electronically stored information in particular.18 
Some courts feel comfortable applying the existing authentica-
tion rules to social networking evidence,19 while others seem 
hesitant about the reliability of such evidence, and as a result, 
heighten existing authentication requirements.20
“As social media, or whatever you want to label it, becomes more prevalent,  
there will be blunders. We’re in experimental mode right now.”2
“[T]he inability to get evidence admitted because of a failure to authenticate it almost always  
is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful advance preparation.”3
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a. Law of auThenTIcaTIon In generaL
The Federal Rules of Evidence direct trial courts to apply 
a sufficiency standard to determine whether a document is 
authentic: the proponent of the evidence must produce evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the writing is what the pro-
ponent claims it to be.21 There only needs to be a prima facie 
showing of authenticity to the court to demonstrate that a rea-
sonable juror could find the document to be authentic.22 “Once 
a prima facie case is made, the evidence goes to the jury, and 
it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of 
the evidence instead of the court.”23 Authentication is simply an 
aspect of relevancy.24 The proponent’s assertion that the writing 
is relevant determines what he claims the writing to be.25
Appellate courts give substantial deference to that deter-
mination, reviewing a lower court’s decision only for an abuse 
of discretion, in which the determination is not to be disturbed 
absent a showing that there is no competent evidence in the record 
to support the decision.26 According to Federal Rule of Evidence 
901(a), documents must be properly authenticated “by evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what 
its proponent claims” as a condition precedent to admissibility.27 
If the document is found admissible, it may be relevant. Most 
state evidence codes echo the wording of Federal Rule 901.28
The traditional justification for authentication require-
ments is to prevent fraud or mistake.29 For example, consider 
a set of documents purported to be a series of threatening letters 
signed by the defendant in a criminal case. The requirement to 
authenticate—or prove—that the letters were actually signed by the 
defendant protects him from the possibility that a third party forged 
the letter to have the defendant arrested or imprisoned for stalking. 
Authentication also protects that same defendant from the risk that 
the letter may have been signed by another person with the same 
name. Beyond the need to prevent mistake and fraud, authentica-
tion also serves to provide context to the jury, without which, any 
given document may be confusing or misleading.30
On the other hand, critics of the authentication require-
ment complain that it demands “proof of what may correctly 
be assumed true in 99 out of 100 cases,” and makes the process 
“at best time-consuming and expensive[ ]” and at “worst . . . 
indefensible.”31
There are many different ways to authenticate evidence, 
based both on the nature of the document and the purpose of 
its use.32 In fact, the Federal Rules allow for authentication 
methods not explicitly considered in the Rules themselves. 
For example, although Rule 901 provides some examples and 
illustrations for ways to authenticate some types of documents, 
it also explicitly states that the list is not exhaustive.33 Rather, 
Rule 901 was purposefully drafted to provide flexibility and 
allow for the authentication of forms of evidence that the drafters 
could not have anticipated.34
In order to authenticate a document, the proponent of the 
evidence must first establish what type of document the prof-
fered evidence purports to be.35 This, however, is generally 
obvious from the document itself and requires no more than a 
witness’ clarification, for example that the document is a letter,36 
a ledger,37 or a photograph.38 The document’s role, and its 
admissibility, more often hinges on other inferences about the 
document.39 Examples of such inferences are: Who wrote it?; 
Who sent it?; Who received it?; Was it altered? The answers to 
each of these questions determine whether or not the document 
is relevant.
Rule 901’s most typical method of authentication is 
identifying the author of the document.40 This, of course, is 
merely part of the document’s relevance.41 The easiest way to 
identify the author is to have a witness with personal knowledge 
authenticate the document by testifying either that he authored 
it, or for automatically created electronic documents, that he is 
familiar with the computer processes that created it.42 However, 
such testimony is not always feasible and is never required.43 
Rather, a document’s author may be identified to meet the 
authentication threshold merely by “[a]ppearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, 
taken in conjunction with circumstances.”44
Indeed, circumstantial evidence alone is often enough to 
satisfy the low authentication bar.45 For example, the Third 
Circuit found that the defendant sufficiently established himself 
as the author of a letter for authentication purposes where the 
letter was seized from the trash outside his house.46 The notes 
were contained in the same garbage bag as other identifying 
information, and they were written on the stationery of a hotel 
where the defendant had stayed.47 Another example comes from 
the Fourth Circuit, in which the court found that the author was 
sufficiently identified for authentication purposes where the 
documents were found in military headquarters with indexing 
numbers unique to the organization reported to have created 
the documents.48 Every other Circuit has also followed this 
circumstantial authentication approach.49 It is clear that courts 
are willing to infer authorship of a document for the purposes of 
authentication through circumstantial evidence alone.
In addition to authorship, relevance can also be established 
solely by identifying the person who received or found a docu-
ment in question.50 Whether a person received a document can 
be important in establishing that person’s knowledge of or 
reaction to the information contained therein, or the fact that 
he was in communication with a given person.51 Inferring that 
a person received a document can be accomplished through 
direct testimony from that person, since that individual would 
have personal knowledge of the communication.52 Once again, 
however, such testimony is not always feasible and is never 
required.53 Rather, circumstantial evidence will often suffice.54 
For example, the fact that an individual showed up at the exact 
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location and time mentioned in the document, was sufficient 
to authenticate that he had received the message.55 Thus, 
circumstantial evidence that an individual “must have read” the 
document can be enough for authentication.56
Another inference the court must make before determining 
that a document is properly authenticated, is finding that the 
document has not been altered from its original state.57 This is 
especially important for photographs, which, although they are 
sometimes included in the category 
of writings, have some distinct au-
thentication rules in case law.58 There 
are two separate issues that must be 
addressed in the authentication pro-
cess for photographs: first, what the 
scene is that the photograph depicts; 
and second, whether the photograph 
is an accurate representation of that 
scene.59 With respect to the first issue, 
a picture may be inadmissible because 
it fails to show the object, place, or 
person in question, but also may be 
“inadmissible, although technically 
accurate, because it portrays a scene 
that is materially different from a 
scene that is relevant to one of the issues at trial.”60 For example, 
if someone materially altered the scene itself, even if it were the 
correct scene, authentication would be barred.61 A photograph 
may also be inadmissible because it has been altered or distorted 
and thus is “inadmissible as a technically inaccurate representation 
of the scene photographed.”62
The problems associated with authenticating photographs 
became even more complicated with the popularization of 
digital photography.63 The rise of digital photography has also 
prompted the creation of technology that alters images in subtle 
ways; in many cases, these subtle alterations have not affected 
the admissibility of the images.64 For example, in United States 
v. Seifert, an arson case, the Eighth Circuit dealt with surveillance 
videotape from a building security system.65 The surveillance 
videotape was filmed at a slower than normal speed in an 
extra-small, extra-dark format.66 To aid the jury in viewing 
the videotape, the prosecution enhanced the videotape in three 
different ways: (1) speeding up the frames to make it look like 
“real time,” (2) enlarging each frame to full-screen size, and (3) 
brightening the film.67 These alterations did not bar authentica-
tion because they “[did] not change the image, but assist[ed] 
the jury in its observation and viewing of the image, which 
[enhanced] their understanding.”68
In United States v. Beeler, the government also sought 
to introduce surveillance videotape that was duplicated and 
enhanced.69 Alterations just like those in Seifert were made 
to the surveillance videotape.70 Likewise, in Beeler, the court 
found that the edited and enhanced version of the videotape was 
an “accurate, authentic, and trustworthy representation[] of the 
original” and admitted the tapes.71 Thus, some digital alterations 
are acceptable. One can imagine other digital processes that are 
possible on computer systems, but unacceptable for purposes of 
authentication, like “photoshopping”72 an object or individual 
into the scene that was not there before.73 Such processes are 
easy to do with digital photography.
The above, well-established, case 
law regarding authentication of hard-
copy documents and photographs has 
become more important as a baseline 
for courts to use in addressing a new 
genre of documentary evidence: 
information stored on computers or 
on the internet. In Lorraine v. Markel 
American Insurance Company, the 
District Court of Maryland noted that 
authentication of documents from a 
computer, often called electronically 
stored information, or “ESI,” may 
require greater scrutiny than that 
required for the authentication of hard 
copy documents.74 The Lorraine court 
surveyed ESI authentication cases from across the country75 
and concluded that admissibility of ESI is “complicated by the 
fact that ESI comes in multiple evidentiary ‘flavors,’ including 
e-mail, website ESI, internet postings, digital photographs, and 
computer-generated documents and data files.”76
Still, the Lorraine court found “no justification for 
constructing unique rules of admissibility of electronic 
communications” because “the same uncertainties exist” in 
ESI as in hard copy documents.77 Those uncertainties echo the 
above discussion about the inferences required to authenticate 
a document: with ESI, the author may be difficult to identify 
given the fact that multiple users may have access to the in-
formation, which makes it more difficult to confirm whether 
the information has been sent or received by a particular 
person, and advanced computer technology makes alteration 
more likely.78 Moreover, most attempts to introduce ESI into 
evidence are through the use of hard copy printouts of the elec-
tronic information.79 This means that the printouts themselves 
must be authenticated as “accurately reflecting the content of 
the online page and the image of the page on the computer at 
which the printout was made.”80 Despite this added complexity, 
courts have adapted a flexible and comprehensive framework 
to address authenticating ESI based on the same core concepts 
used for authentication in general.81 These core concepts include 
identifying the author or creator, identifying the person who 
received the document, and determining whether the document 
is an accurate representation of a person, place, or thing.82
The problems associated 
with authenticating 
photographs became even 
more complicated with 
the popularization of 
digital photography.
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B. auThenTIcaTIng socIaL neTworKIng weBsITes
Social networking websites have many features that 
parties have sought to enter into evidence at trial.83 Such 
evidence includes: (1) personal messages sent via social 
networking websites; (2) postings on an individual account 
holder’s web pages; (3) photographs posted on an individual’s 
account or web page; and (4) “tags,” in which one account-
holder lists another individual’s name to indicate that that 
person is in a photograph, at an event, or simply has something 
to do with a comment.
Further, as is the case with the many types of documents 
subject to authentication, the different parts of social network-
ing websites each present unique problems for authentication. 
Most of these problems can be addressed by using the same set 
of inferences used for authentication in general. Of course, if 
the person who is alleged to have sent the message, posted the 
information, appeared in the photograph, or otherwise made the 
statement, simply testifies to his personal knowledge that he 
sent it, posted it, or was present at the scene, then the inquiry 
ends there, and the exhibit—most often a hard copy print-out 
of electronic information—is authenticated.84 However, in 
many circumstances, the person against whom the document is 
offered will not testify or will deny creating the document.85 
In such cases, the myriad types of ESI that might be introduced 
and the ways to authenticate this diverse category of evidence 
“underscore[] the need for counsel to be creative in identifying 
methods of authenticating” the evidence.86
1. Messages
One of the many functions of social networking websites is 
to provide an online forum for the communication of messages. 
These websites allow users to sign into personal accounts and 
send messages to other individuals who have accounts on the 
same website. Like email, the messages are electronic com-
munications sent from a given account with a clear timestamp. 
Like email, the user must provide the correct password in order 
to access the account and send a message. Also like email, the 
user may choose to send the message to a single receiver or 
to a specified group of recipients. In developing an approach 
to authenticate Facebook and MySpace messages, courts have 
looked to e-mail and other electronic communications as either 
a model to be followed or a starting point from which to embark 
on the path to authentication.87
In its survey of ESI authentication across the federal system, 
the District Court of Maryland noted that “[t]he most frequent 
ways to authenticate e-mail evidence are 901(b)(1) (person with 
personal knowledge), 901(b)(3) (expert testimony or compari-
son with authenticated exemplar), [and] 901(b)(4) (distinctive 
characteristics, including circumstantial evidence).”88 Indeed, 
all three of these methods are used to authenticate internet 
postings in general.89 Once again, because identification of the 
author basically determines whether the exhibit is relevant, 
it is the most important inference in a message. Importantly, 
however, when it comes to the author or sender of an e-mail, 
“the sending address in an e-mail message is not conclusive” 
because someone with unauthorized access to an account —or 
even an authorized user acting outside the scope of the autho-
rization he was given—could always send an e-mail in the 
account owner’s name.90 The same possibility—that someone 
other than the account holder could send a message without the 
account holder’s authorization—is present and prevalent with 
messages sent from social networking accounts.
Existing case law91 indicates that courts have generally 
taken one of three approaches with respect to authenticating 
messages sent on Facebook and MySpace. The first approach 
likens social networking website messages to e-mail and 
requires no further information to authenticate messages than 
what is required for email.92 The other approaches go a step 
further and require either testimony about the distinctive nature 
of the messages’ content,93 the security settings of the social 
networking website,94 or both.95 This article refers to these 
other approaches as the corroboration approach, the security 
approach, and the combined approach, respectively. 
i. The E-mail Parallel Approach
The first approach requires little information to authenticate 
messages sent from Facebook, MySpace, and other similar sites. 
One example of this more lax approach is People v. Clevenstine, 
a rape case in which an appellate court in New York found 
sufficient authentication of MySpace messages based on noth-
ing more than the fact that the messages were sent from the 
defendant’s account.96 Referring back to the existing e-mail 
framework, this is the equivalent of finding an e-mail’s author 
sufficiently identified for authentication, solely because it was 
sent from that individual’s e-mail address.
In Clevenstine, the prosecution sought to introduce 
MySpace messages sent from the defendant to an alleged rape 
victim.97 The defendant did not testify.98 Testimony about the 
MySpace messages included the following: the defendant’s 
wife found the messages on the defendant’s computer, and she 
recalled the content of the communications; the police retrieved 
a record of the messages from the victim’s hard drive, which 
meant the messages were written from his computer; and a 
MySpace legal compliance officer testified that the defendant 
had created the sending account.99 The Clevenstine court found 
that to be sufficient for authentication.100
The court recognized the possibility that someone else 
could have accessed the defendant’s MySpace account, but held 
that “the likelihood of such a scenario presented a factual issue 
for the jury,” rather than a bar to authentication.101 There was 
no testimony about whether the content of the messages was 
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information only the defendant would have known, or whether 
the writing style resembled his.102 Despite recognizing the 
potential risk that the defendant had not written the messages 
in question, the court found them sufficiently authenticated for 
admission into evidence.103 Thus, the Clevenstine approach 
deemed messages authentic despite the presence of unanswered 
questions, which, as discussed below, other courts have considered 
highly relevant.104
ii. The Corroboration Approach
Courts following the other two approaches require something 
beyond unsubstantiated testimony that the account belongs to the 
defendant and that the messages were written from the defen-
dant’s computer.105 These two approaches can be classified as: 
(1) the corroboration approach; and (2) the security approach, 
which requires testimony about the security procedures in place 
for the social networking website.106 The rigorous corrobora-
tion approach is similar to the process of authenticating e-mails 
through circumstantial evidence; e-mails are often deemed 
authenticated as to authorship by inclusion of factual details 
known only to the individual to whom the message is attributed 
along with some other corroborating evidence.107 Insofar as 
e-mail is concerned, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and various 
district courts have followed this approach.108
The simplest corroboration approach focuses only on the 
content of the messages. In such cases, courts explicitly rely on 
authentication practices for e-mail and draw analogies to mes-
sages sent via social networking websites.109 For example, in 
Manuel v. State, a Texas court dealt with MySpace messages in 
a stalking case.110 In determining whether the proffered infor-
mation identified the defendant as the author, the court noted 
that in Massimo v. State, e-mails were authenticated where, 
inter alia, (1) a witness recognized the e-mail address as be-
longing to the defendant; (2) the e-mails discussed information 
only the victim, defendant, and a few other people knew; and 
(3) the e-mails were written in a way the defendant was known 
to communicate.111
The Manuel court reviewed the content and writing style of 
the many messages sent to the victim via MySpace and based 
on the case law for authenticating e-mail in Massimo, concluded 
that the content was distinctive enough to tie the defendant to 
the message in such a way that a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that the defendant sent all of the messages.112 This was 
especially true in Manuel because other evidence corroborated 
information in the MySpace messages. For example, in one 
message the sender discussed giving the victim a ring, and later 
gave a ring to a friend to deliver to the victim.113 This corrobora-
tion requirement has existed for e-mail authentication for over a 
decade.114 Courts now treat this corroboration requirement as an 
established principle for e-mails; most frequently, identification 
of authorship through the e-mail address must be corroborated 
by other authenticating factors, like content, circumstances, 
internal patterns, and extrinsic evidence.115
Instead of wholesale adoption of the e-mail approach, some 
courts combine both the security and corroboration approaches, 
resulting in the most burdensome approach to authenticating so-
cial networking messages.116 One example of a court following 
this combined “security and corroboration approach” is State 
v. Eleck, an assault case in which defense counsel sought to 
admit messages allegedly sent by a witness from her Facebook 
account to the defendant’s Facebook account.117 The witness, 
who was called by the state, testified that prior to the assault the 
defendant stated to her, in person, that “if anyone messes with 
me tonight, I’m going to stab them.”118 On direct, she testified 
that she had not spoken or communicated with the defendant ei-
ther in person or on the computer since the incident.119 Defense 
counsel sought to impeach the witness by showing that she had 
been in touch with the defendant since the incident through 
Facebook messages.120
The defendant sought to introduce purported Facebook 
messages between the defendant and the witness in order 
to impeach the witness, who denied having spoken with the 
defendant in person or on the computer since the assault.121 To 
authenticate the messages, the defendant took the stand and 
reported downloading and printing the messages from his com-
puter.122 He further identified photographs and other postings on 
the account that suggested that the witness was the owner of the 
account.123 The witness herself even admitted that the username 
was hers and she was the true account owner, but she denied 
sending the messages.124 She testified that someone hacked into 
her account and changed her password, so she no longer had 
access to the account.125 Specifically, she asserted that the 
account was hacked two weeks before her testimony—not at 
the time the messages were sent.126
Although this situation appears to be a traditional cred-
ibility dispute, which would present a question for the jury 
under the sufficiency standard discussed above, the trial court 
did not treat it that way. Instead, the trial court excluded the 
messages, and the appellate court affirmed, finding insufficient 
information to authenticate that the witness wrote the Facebook 
messages.127 The court found that the parties established that the 
messages came from the witness’ account, but not that she had, 
in fact, written and sent them.128 Thus the court concluded that 
the messages were inadmissible.129
The Eleck court noted that while the traditional rules of 
evidence likely provided a sufficient framework for authenticat-
ing such messages, there needed to be some sort of circumstantial 
evidence to establish that the named sender was the actual 
author.130 In fact, the court gave several examples of the type 
of corroborating information that could have been used to 
authenticate the sender of the messages.131 One example was 
showing that the content on the sender’s account established the 
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author’s identity.132 Another was showing that the information 
included in the messages was known solely to the alleged 
sender.133 That information, the court noted, must be “distinctive 
of the purported author and . . . corroborated by other events 
or with forensic computer evidence.”134 The court found that 
the messages’ mere suggestion of acrimonious history between 
the witness and the defendant was not sufficiently distinctive to 
establish the defendant as a sender because other people could 
have known about it.135 In other words, these messages did not 
pass muster under the corroboration approach.
The court also suggested 
searching the computer’s 
internet history,136 presum-
ably referring to IP address137 
information, to show that the 
user signed on from that com-
puter.138 Although the court 
recognized that the possibil-
ity that the witness’ account 
had been hacked was “dubi-
ous”—especially given that 
the messages were sent prior to 
the alleged hacking—the court 
still found that there was insuf-
ficient foundation that she had 
authored and sent the messages 
herself.139 In short, the court 
found that the messages were 
not authenticated under the 
security approach, either.140
The Eleck court set a 
higher bar for the authentica-
tion of messages sent from 
social networking websites 
than did the Clevenstine 
court in New York.141 Eleck specifically mentioned that social 
networking websites suffer from a “general lack of security” 
which “raises an issue as to whether a third party may have 
sent the messages.”142 Perhaps in addition to meeting the low 
sufficiency standard for relevance under Rule 401 and the 
slightly higher sufficiency standard for authentication under 
Rule 901, the Eleck court—without explicitly saying so— 
imported concerns normally dealt with under Rule 403, which 
include “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”143 Absent this implicit move, it is 
difficult to understand why the Eleck court did not simply 
mirror the requirements of e-mail authentication.
iii. The Security Approach
Among the requirements the Eleck court demanded to meet 
its heightened standard was testimony about the security proce-
dures in place for social networking websites.144 This court was 
not the first to do so. In fact, other courts have not just suggested 
this approach in dicta, but have actually used it.145
The Eleck court relied on a recent Massachusetts case in 
which a court held that proof that a MySpace message came 
from a particular account, without further authenticating 
evidence that a particular 
person actually wrote it, 
was inadequate proof of 
authorship.146 In that case, 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 
the prosecutor entered into 
evidence MySpace messages 
sent from the defendant’s 
brother’s account, and the 
defendant unsuccessfully 
moved to strike the mes-
sages.147 The appellate court 
found that the messages were 
not authenticated because 
there was insufficient informa-
tion identifying the sender.148 
As the Eleck court later 
echoed, Williams highlighted 
the need for information 
about the website’s privacy 
and security measures–“[a]
though it appears that the 
sender of the messages was 
using [defendant’s brother’s] 
MySpace Web ‘page,’ there is 
no testimony . . . regarding how secure such a Web page is, who 
can access a MySpace Web page, whether codes are needed for 
such access, etc.”149
Therefore, the security approach represents a big leap 
forward from the traditional authentication process, requiring 
information about security procedures, customarily absent from 
authentication of e-mails.
iv. Summary and Recommendations
Based on the above cases, there appears to be three 
different approaches to authenticating messages sent from 
social networking websites. The first, which is the lowest 
hurdle, requires information showing that the messages were 
sent from the user’s account. This approach considers the 
risk that a third party hacked into the account as going to the 
evidence’s weight and not its admissibility. The next two 
The rigorous corroboration 
approach is similar to the process 
of authenticating e-mails through 
circumstantial evidence; e-mails 
are often deemed authenticated 
as to authorship by inclusion of 
factual details known only to the 
individual to whom the message is 
attributed along with some other 
corroborating evidence.
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approaches require something beyond proof that the messages 
were sent from a given account to establish authorship. The 
corroboration approach follows the courts’ procedure for e-mail 
authentication, looking to the distinctive nature of the content 
or other corroborating information to show authorship. The 
security approach goes beyond the established approach to 
e-mail, calling for proof regarding the social networking web-
sites’ privacy and security settings. The combined corroboration 
and security approach requires both.
Although there is little case law addressing this issue to 
date, there is some indication that the approach to authentica-
tion varies depending on how vital the piece of evidence is to 
the case and on how severe the charges are.150 Where the case 
truly hinges on a certain message, more details are required 
to establish authorship. For example, in Clevenstine, the rape 
case, the messages from the defendant to the victims were of 
secondary importance, given that the victims’ testimony about 
the rape itself was more integral to the case.151 Accordingly, the 
court deemed the messages authenticated despite the recognized 
risk that the defendant may not have sent them.152 By contrast, 
in Eleck, the assault case, the message went to the defendant’s 
intent to harm, which was key evidence; accordingly, that court 
required extra evidence to establish authorship.153
Courts have yet to explain the underlying justification for 
raising the bar for authentication when it comes to messages 
sent from social networking websites rather than from e-mail 
accounts.154 There is no reason for the heightened requirement 
of discussing the websites’ security settings. The security 
settings are similar—both are password-protected; to access 
the account, an individual must enter an accurate username and 
password. The expectations of user privacy are also similar in 
that both are private messages from one sender to a particular 
receiver that are not publicly displayed. With respect to the 
concern about hackers, both an e-mail account and a social 
networking account can be hacked into—no court has offered 
information about why it would be more likely to occur in the 
social networking context.155 To that end, parties seeking to 
admit such messages should explain to the court that there is 
no real difference between sending a message from a social 
networking website versus an e-mail account. Parties seeking 
to admit this type of evidence should remind the court that the 
messages are, in purpose and in effect, no different from e-mail, 
which is routinely authenticated and admitted into evidence.156
In contrast, parties seeking to exclude messages from social 
networking websites should rely heavily on Eleck’s corrobora-
tion and security approaches.157 It would be useful to call an 
expert witness prepared to discuss the fallibility of Facebook 
and MySpace password protection, impressing on courts the 
ease with which third parties can hack into a user’s account.158 
Beyond infiltrating another user’s account, parties seeking 
to exclude this evidence should also explain to the court the 
all-too-common practice of creating fake accounts on social 
networking websites, in which people create accounts in other 
people’s names.159
To counter such an approach, the proponent of the evidence 
must come to court with his own witness familiar with the 
security settings.160 This, however, could mean that the security-
driven approach may lead to a battle-of-the-experts, which 
would be an undesirable outcome on two fronts. First, a battle-
of-the-experts could risk losing the jury’s attention, adding 
needless time to each trial, and decreasing the jury’s compre-
hension. Second, it could decrease the perceived fairness of the 
proceedings, particularly for indigent criminal defendants, who 
most likely will not be able to afford to hire this type of expert. 
Although Eleck used the corroboration approach, the opinion 
called for security testimony as well.161 Perhaps in recognition 
of the undesirability of this outcome and the questionable need 
to distinguish these messages from e-mail, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the limited issue 
of authentication of the Facebook messages.162
In sum, the various approaches to authentication of 
messages sent from social networking websites have the poten-
tial to lead to quite different trial records and outcomes. These 
messages appear to be, for all intents and purposes, nearly iden-
tical to e-mail messages. Some courts resist the comparison and 
require a higher threshold of evidence to authenticate, but they 
do so without providing a meaningful distinction between the 
two types of messages. Whether or not the Eleck approach will 
remain good law in Connecticut will, perhaps, determine the 
trend in jurisdictions across the country.
2. Postings
In contrast to messages sent on social networking websites, 
wall postings on these same websites are quite different from 
e-mail. In addressing authentication of wall postings, courts 
tend not to analogize to e-mail at all, but rather to postings on 
other public forums on the web.163
Internet postings constitute a complex category that 
includes “data posted by the site owner, data posted by 
others with consent of the site owner, and data posted by others 
without consent, such as ‘hackers.”164 Reactions to internet post-
ings in court have ranged from “famous skepticism” to a “more 
permissive approach[.]”165 When it comes to postings on social 
networking sites, there are even more subdivisions to add: data 
posted on one’s own wall by the account owner, data posted 
on the account owner’s wall by other users, and data posted in 
various groups or forums by an account user.
The “wall” or “page” generally refers to a public space on 
an individual’s account homepage, or “profile page,” where 
information can be posted for viewing. The account user de-
termines which people can view the information posted on his 
wall. The user can allow universal access to the information, 
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or he can limit access to defined groups: people in the same 
regional network, people from the same school, people he is 
“friends” with on the website, and individuals with whom the 
user has acknowledged a relationship. Given the various privacy 
settings, “Facebook wall postings and the MySpace comments 
are not strictly ‘public,’ but are accessible only to those users 
[the account holder] selects.”166 In practice, such postings can 
“be viewed by anyone with access to the user’s profile page.”167 
Moreover, “[a]lthough a social networking site generally 
requires a unique username and password for the user to both 
establish a profile and access it, posting on the site by those that 
befriend the user does not.”168
As with messages, the principal inference concerning 
the authentication of wall posts is who wrote the post—was 
it really the account holder to whom the post is attributed, or 
did someone else write it?169 Because of its novelty, courts 
have had little opportunity to address this issue. However, the 
issue has reached one state supreme court, which highlights its 
importance.170
In Griffin v. State, a murder case, the Maryland Supreme 
Court dealt with authenticating posts on the MySpace profile 
page allegedly belonging to the defendant’s girlfriend, witness 
Jessica Barber.171 The trial court admitted hard copy printouts 
of her alleged profile page.172 The prosecution sought to use 
posts on her profile page to demonstrate that Ms. Barber had 
threatened another State witness in an apparent attempt to 
prevent that witness from testifying against the defendant.173 
The post contained some identifying information that connected 
the page to Ms. Barber, including her birthday, gender, and 
hometown.174 Notably, the page also contained a threatening 
post: “FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET 
STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”175
When she took the stand, Ms. Barber was not questioned 
about the pages allegedly printed from her MySpace profile.176 
Instead, the State sought to authenticate the profile posting 
solely through the testimony of the lead investigator in the 
case, Sergeant John Cook.177 In lieu of his testimony, the parties 
entered a stipulation that the investigator logged onto MySpace 
and found the profile page with a photograph that resembled 
Ms. Barber along with the identifying information listed above, 
which is why he believed it to be her account.178 The parties 
further stipulated that the statement in question was posted on 
that profile page.179 The court concluded that this stipulated 
information established that the profile page belonged to Ms. 
Barber, but did not address whether she actually had authored 
the threatening post.180 This is because the court was concerned 
that, despite the identifying information, the profile may not 
have been Ms. Barber’s at all.181
Among the issues discussed in Griffin, the court focused 
on the fact that people viewing a MySpace page have no idea 
whether the information is real or not. “A person observing the 
online profile of a user with whom the observer is unacquainted 
has no idea whether the profile is legitimate.”182 The court’s 
great concern was two-fold: first, that someone could “create 
a fictitious account and masquerade under another person’s 
name[;]”183 and about the potential for hackers—people who 
“gain access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s user-
name and password[.]”184 In short, “[t]he potential for fabricating 
or tampering with electronically stored information on a social 
networking site . . . poses significant challenges from the stand-
point of authentication of printouts of the site[.]”185 Bringing 
it back to the facts at hand, this means that while the content 
posted on the page was certainly a threat, it may not have 
been real—someone could have faked the entire profile, and, 
accordingly, faked the threat. Acknowledging its unfamiliarity 
with social networking websites, as in the messaging cases, 
the Griffin court turned to authentication of other types of ESI 
for guidance.186 But, given the concerns mentioned above, the 
Griffin court concluded that from a policy perspective, post-
ings require “greater scrutiny [than typical ESI] because of the 
heightened possibility for manipulation by other than the true 
user or poster.”187
In Griffin, the court concluded that there are two stages at 
which authentication of authorship is required for wall postings: 
first, the proponent of the evidence must show that the alleged 
account holder—here, Ms. Barber—is really the person who 
created the account; and second, the proponent must show 
that the account holder is also the author of the post in ques-
tion.188 As in Eleck, the Griffin court suggested various ways to 
authenticate postings on social networking websites: (1) having 
the author admit to writing the post in question; (2) searching 
the author’s computer to examine whether the website was 
accessed from that computer; or (3) getting information from 
the social networking website linking the profile and the post 
to the alleged author.189 Some sort of “extrinsic evidence” is 
needed.190 However, even those methods do not foreclose the 
possibility that another person accessed the witness’ account 
and computer.
In Griffin, the lower court found that the officer’s testi-
mony about the photograph, the correct birth date listed on the 
profile page, as well as the rest of its content, sufficiently linked 
the page to Ms. Barber.191 Ultimately, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals reversed the lower court and found that the pages were 
not properly authenticated and should not have been admitted 
into evidence.192 No petition for review has been filed with the 
Supreme Court to date, despite the dissent’s characterization of 
the majority’s treatment of Facebook postings as “technological 
heebie jeebies[.]”193
The two dissenting judges in the Griffin appeal case found 
that the identifying information in the messages considered by 
the majority was actually sufficient for a reasonable juror to 
conclude that the information was authored by Ms. Barber.194 
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With respect to the majority’s fear that hackers, rather than 
the account holder, authored the messages, the dissent did not 
consider that fear in the abstract, but rather looked at the record, 
which they found “suggest[ed] no motive” for anyone to do 
so.195 According to the dissent, any lingering threat that a hacker 
had authored the messages should go to weight, not admissi-
bility, and should be dealt with through cross-examination.196 
Thus, the Griffin dissenters’ approach added no extra burden 
and more closely paralleled typical e-mail authentication. 
Nevertheless, the Griffin majority’s more burdensome standard 
remains good law.
Beyond Griffin, in which a witness allegedly posted 
information on her own profile page, lies a situation yet to be 
considered by any court. In this scenario, a social networking 
website user posts information on another individual’s profile 
page or wall. Here, the danger of hackers posting information 
while the user remains unaware is much higher. In the Griffin 
context, if a hacker posted information on the user’s own profile 
page, it is reasonable to conclude that the user would eventu-
ally come across that information. After all, the information is 
posted on his own account. By contrast, if a hacker logs in to 
a user’s account and posts on a different individual’s wall, the 
user may never learn of the post.
To demonstrate this problem, consider a variation of the 
facts in Griffin. Assume, for the sake of illustration, that the 
account in question in fact belongs to Ms. Barber. Now, assume 
the account is hacked. Instead of posting a threat to the prosecu-
tion’s witness on Ms. Barber’s own profile page, the hacker 
logs into Ms. Barber’s account, clicks to view the other witness’ 
profile, then posts the threat on that witness’ profile page. Ms. 
Barber may never learn that the hacker authored such a post on 
the other person’s page, unless she logs into her own account 
and decides to view that person’s profile page herself. No court 
has dealt with this issue yet, but it presumably adds yet another 
step to the authentication process for postings.
As in messaging, then, the possibility of hackers is a hurdle 
that potentially blocks authentication of wall postings.197 This 
hurdle is even more apt for wall posting because the account 
holder may never learn of information posted on someone else’s 
wall from his own account; until recently, unlike messages there 
was no “outbox” that kept a record of outgoing posts the way 
there was for outgoing messages. Therefore, the risk of hack-
ers has been treated as preempting a finding of facts sufficient 
for authentication even when the posting is on the purported 
author’s own “wall.” In Griffin, that risk was allocated to the 
proponent of the posting, and the court put the onus on the 
proponent to somehow reduce the risk in order to satisfy the 
sufficiency standard.198
Moreover, in the situations described above—information 
posted on one’s own profile or on another user’s wall or page—
another real problem is the content of the information posted. 
Even if authorship is established, the relevance of the post may 
be questionable.199 At least in Griffin, the post was offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the post.200 The court 
was attempting to use that post to show that she had threatened 
another witness.201 This indicates that courts are treating asser-
tions on social networking sites as true statements. Research 
outside of the legal field suggests that this is not exactly a 
reliable approach, because “[b]eing able to communicate in a 
faceless manner [through social networking websites] from the 
comfort of one’s own living room tends to make people bolder 
than they are in real life.”202 This means that people may write 
wall postings that simply do not reflect their thoughts, feelings, 
or behaviors in the world beyond the web.203 Accordingly, it 
would behoove parties seeking to exclude such information to 
explain to the courts that even if authorship were established, 
the information is still not relevant because it is not an accurate 
reflection of any person’s true state of mind or intent. Still, “the 
standard of authentication is relatively low,” so the evidence 
may come in despite such warnings.204
[P]eople may write wall postings that simply do not reflect their 
thoughts, feelings, or behaviors in the world beyond the web. 
Accordingly, it would behoove parties seeking to exclude such 
information to explain to the courts that even if authorship were 
established, the information is still not relevant because it is not an 
accurate reflection of any person’s true state of mind or intent.
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Of course, the above discussion is simply a prediction, 
since only the Griffin court has addressed this issue. Whether 
other jurisdictions decide to follow the Griffin court’s lead, or 
the self-proclaimed more technologically savvy dissent, whose 
approach parallels e-mail authentication, will shape the litiga-
tion practice regarding postings on social networking sites.
3. Photographs
In addition to providing a forum for communication of 
messages and public posting of information, social networking 
websites also serve as online, shareable photo albums. First, 
each individual user can post a “profile picture,” which is shown 
on the user’s profile page. When the user posts on other profiles, 
groups, or sends a message, his chosen profile picture appears 
alongside the message. Users can change their profile pictures 
whenever they want, and old profile pictures are gathered in 
a lasting album on the user’s page. Beyond profile pictures, 
social networking websites allow users to upload photographs 
to create albums to share with others. There is no limit to the 
number of photographs that users may upload and share. On 
every photograph, the user has an option to create a caption. 
Other users given permission to view the album can also post 
comments to each photograph or to the album as a whole.
Some social networking websites, like Facebook, have 
a feature that allows users to “tag” their friends in pictures. 
Essentially, a tag is a way to identify who is in the picture. If 
a user’s account is tagged in a picture, he will receive notice. 
However, there is no photo-recognition technology that notifies 
a user whenever a photo of him has been shared on Facebook. 
Moreover, if the person has tagged another user improperly—
using the wrong spelling, for example—the user will not be 
notified that the photograph has been posted.
There is no feature on social networking websites that 
monitors the content of the photograph and there is no way to 
determine if whatever caption posted to the photograph is accu-
rate. Further, there are only minimal tools available for alerting 
the websites to inappropriate or inaccurate photographs. For 
example, on Facebook the user has an option to “report” a 
photo to the website administration. The user is limited to two 
categories for reporting a photograph: that the photograph is a 
picture of the user and the user either does not like the photo or 
finds it to be harassing; or that the photograph is not of the user, 
but rather is “spam or scam, nudity or pornography, graphic 
violence, hate speech or symbol, illegal drug use, [or] my 
friend’s account might be compromised or hacked.”205 There is 
no option available to report that the photograph is inaccurate 
or altered.
At least two courts have addressed the use at trial of 
photographs uploaded onto social networking websites and later 
printed out as hard copies.206 Both have referred to methods 
of authenticating photographs in general.207 Photographs are 
usually authenticated “by a witness with personal knowledge 
of the scene depicted who can testify that the photo fairly and 
accurately describes [the scene].”208
As described above, authenticating photographs became 
more complex with the advent of digital photography. As one 
court explained it, digital photographs “present unique authen-
tication problems because they are a form of electronically 
produced evidence that may be manipulated and altered.”209 
Once digital photographs are uploaded to computers, even 
with the simplest of programs like Photoshop, concerns exist 
about people “removing, inserting, or highlighting” particular 
aspects of the photograph.210 For that reason, two inferential 
leaps are required to authenticate a digital photograph from a 
social networking website: beyond determining that the scene 
depicts what the party says it depicts, the court must also find 
that a reasonable juror could conclude that the photograph has 
not been altered in any impermissible way.211
In People v. Beckley, a murder case, the prosecution sought 
to admit photographs posted on the defendant’s MySpace 
page.212 At issue in the case was whether the defendant was 
a gang member and whether the shooting was part of gang retali-
ation.213 The pictures showed one of the defense witnesses flashing 
gang signs.214 The prosecution sought to use the pictures to impeach 
the witness by rebutting her testimony that she did not associate 
with gang members.215 The defense conceded that the face in 
the photograph was in fact a picture of the witness, but still 
challenged its authenticity.216
As a first step, the Beckley court looked to case law about 
authenticating photographs in general, and noted that, like mes-
sages and other postings from social networking websites, a 
photograph is a writing and likewise requires authentication.217 
Beyond the general premise that photographs must be authen-
ticated, the Beckley court also highlighted “the untrustworthi-
ness of images downloaded from the internet.”218 Specifically, 
the court noted that anyone can post a photograph online, that 
photographs on websites are not monitored for accuracy, that 
images are not posted under oath, and that hackers can easily 
adulterate images posted to the web.219
Mirroring the need for expert testimony in the context of 
messages, the Beckley court explained that testimony from a 
photographic expert that the photograph was not a composite 
and had not been faked is “critical,” and could have authenti-
cated the photograph in question.220 The need for expert testimony 
for photographic social networking evidence brings up fair-
ness concerns for criminal defendants, echoing the concerns 
discussed above in the messaging context. It is unlikely that 
many criminal defendants can afford the fees required to have 
such expert testimony in court.221 Because no such expert testi-
fied in Beckley, the court concluded that the photographs were 
not properly authenticated and should have been excluded.222 
But, the court found that their admission was merely harmless 
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error.223 The Beckley court’s approach is on par with existing 
approaches to authenticating digital photographs in general: 
that the photograph happened to be posted on MySpace did not 
trigger any additional requirements for authentication.
People v. Lenihan, a murder case in New York, went 
further than Beckley, suggesting that not even expert testimony 
could solve the authentication problem for photographs found 
on social networking websites.224 In Lenihan the defendant 
sought to use photographs printed from MySpace to cross-
examine witnesses about their alleged gang ties.225 Besides the 
photographs, there was no other evidence of the witnesses’ gang 
membership that could be used to justify the questions on cross-
examination.226 The defendant’s mother found photographs on 
MySpace that allegedly depicted the state’s witnesses making 
hand gestures and wearing clothing that suggested an affiliation 
with a certain gang.227 Like Beckley, the Lenihan court deter-
mined that the photographs could not be properly authenticated 
“[i]n light of the ability to ‘photo shop,’ [or] edit photographs 
on the computer[.]”228 In fact, the court was so convinced that 
there was no way to authenticate the photographs that it com-
pletely barred the defendant from cross-examining the state’s 
witnesses about their gang affiliation and confronting them 
with the photographs.229 The Lenihan court was so sure that the 
photographs could not be authenticated that it was willing to bet 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights 
by denying the cross-examination.230
These two cases have strong implications for the evidentiary 
role of photographs uploaded to social networking websites. 
Despite publicized warnings about keeping questionable photo-
graphs off of the internet,231 the minimal case law here suggests 
that an individual’s online images are not a problem once the 
case reaches the courtroom unless (1) the witness concedes that 
the photographs are authentic; or (2) an expert testifies that the 
photographs have not been altered.232 Absent these two criteria, 
social networking website photographs are unlikely to be used 
against a witness at trial under Beckley and Lenihan.233
Still, social networking website users would be wise to 
monitor photographs that do end up online, as courts may feel 
more comfortable admitting such photographs as they become 
more comfortable with social networking websites in general. 
Further, the courts in both Beckley and Lenihan essentially 
gave instructions for parties seeking to use such photographs 
as evidence.234 According to Beckley, all the proponent of such 
evidence must do is hire an expert in digital photography to 
testify that the photograph is not a composite and that the scene 
depicted in the photograph on the social networking site had 
not been altered in a meaningful way.235 If the Beckley court’s 
instructions hold and parties actually follow that advice, then it 
will not be long before such photographs are routinely entered 
into evidence.
4. Comments, Tags, and Other Notifications
Courts have had the chance to address the evidentiary use 
of messages, postings, and photographs from social networking 
websites, and as described above, the law of authenticating each 
of those types of evidence will likely evolve over the next few 
years. In addition to adaptations in their approaches to those 
three types of evidence, courts will inevitably be faced with 
evidence in the form of the many other tools and features of 
social networking websites. Because there is no available case 
law on the rest of these features, one can only imagine how the 
courts will handle attempts to use them as evidence. It is helpful 
to understand the many features of social networking websites 
before predicting how courts will treat them.
“Tags,” in photographs, status updates, or wall postings, 
have not been addressed in court. “[P]hoto tagging is a popular 
feature that allows users to identify themselves or other mem-
bers of the site by name in photos. A photo tag creates a link 
to that user’s profile and identifies the person and her specific 
location in the photo.”236 Any user can tag another user with 
whom he is friends in a photo. Although the tagged user has the 
option to remove her account name—her online identity—from 
the photograph, the photograph remains on the social network-
ing site until the user who uploaded it chooses to take it down.237 
The initial tagging process is unmonitored, and a user can feel 
free to tag any part of a photograph as any one of his friends, 
despite the possibility that the tags may be incorrect.238
The tagging process also extends beyond photographs to 
postings. A relatively new feature on Facebook allows users to 
tag friends in status updates and comments as well.239 Likewise, 
the tag may not be valid, but the post will remain on the site 
until the user who authored it decides to delete it. Further, in 
addition to tagging, both Facebook and MySpace allow users 
to caption or comment on photographs that they post or photo-
graphs posted by other people.
Extending courts’ logic of authenticating messages and 
photographs to tagging, the problems only worsen. First, the 
same susceptibility to hacking exists—in fact, if anything it is 
even more prevalent with tagging. This is especially true given 
that unlike messages or photographs, the user may never receive 
notification that his account posted a comment or a tag on some-
one else’s account. Further, if the user infrequently checks his 
account, he may have been tagged in countless photographs or 
comments inaccurately or inappropriately. For example, imag-
ine one user has posted a photograph onto his own Facebook 
profile page. The photograph depicts a scene at night. It is dark 
outside. There are several people in the photograph, but their 
faces are obscured because of the darkness. Although their 
faces cannot be seen, the metallic glare of guns held in each 
of their hands can be seen. The user tags a criminal defendant 
in the photograph. That criminal defendant does not log on to 
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Facebook anymore, so he receives no notice of the tag. In his 
prosecution for gang-related crimes, the government seeks to 
use the photograph against the defendant to show that he had 
access to a firearm. There are several possible explanations 
for why the defendant was tagged in that photograph. First, of 
course, he could have been in the photograph. Second, it could 
have been a joke—the user could have uploaded a random pho-
tograph he found on the internet and tagged his friends in it. 
Third, it could have been a mistaken tag: the user meant to tag a 
different friend with a similar name, and wound up tagging the 
defendant. Because of the myriad possibilities, the meaning of a 
tag is even less clear than a message or a photograph.
While a tag may indicate that the tagged user is in a pho-
tograph, as above, or has participated in some activity with the 
tagging user, it may also indicate that the tagging user wishes 
only to get the tagged user’s 
attention. The meaning of a tag 
in a photograph or comment, 
then, is speculative at best. 
Another example illustrates 
the complexity of this problem. 
Imagine one user posts a photo-
graph picturing no people, but 
only guns. Another user tags 
the defendant in a criminal case 
in the photograph. There is no 
indication that the defendant 
ever received notice of the tag. 
Certainly there is no way that 
the tag actually indicates that the 
defendant is in the photograph. 
Can the state use the photograph 
to indicate the defendant’s con-
nection to firearms? There are 
many necessary inferences to 
authentication in this situation. 
First, who tagged the defen-
dant? The general issues of 
authenticating the author of any 
social networking communication apply at this level. Next, 
what is the photograph intending to depict and has it been 
altered? The general issues of authenticating a photograph also 
apply. Finally, what, if anything, is the truth that a tag asserts? 
Although it seems inevitable that parties will eventually seek to 
enter such tags as evidence, it seems unlikely that courts will 
jump through each of these hoops to authenticate such a tag on a 
social networking website because it would take too much time 
and energy for very little probative value.
concLusIon
Courts are just beginning to shape the law of authenticating 
social networking websites. Various courts’ approaches are 
shaped by their unfamiliarity with the websites and how they 
work, which leads to hesitation to fit social networking evidence 
into the framework of existing authentication procedures for 
other electronically stored information. Given that hesitation, 
the trend is for courts to require something beyond typical ESI 
authentication procedures, including information about the 
security settings of social networking websites before determin-
ing that a given piece of evidence is authentic.240
However, as courts become more familiar with social 
networking websites and their use in court increases, such 
additional requirements of the “sufficiency” standard may be 
dropped. Indeed, those addi-
tional requirements should be 
dropped—without delay—with 
respect to messages sent from 
social networking websites. As 
described above, there is no 
difference between sending an 
electronic communication from 
an e-mail account or a social 
networking account. The pur-
pose, function, outbox, privacy 
settings, and potential for hack-
ers are exactly the same for both 
types of accounts. Concededly, 
there may be a need for height-
ened authentication require-
ments when it comes to other 
features of social networking 
websites, including posts and 
photographs and especially 
tags, where the user may not 
have a record of the communi-
cation and where the purpose 
of the communication may not 
be clear. But there is simply no need to impose any additional 
requirements with messages, which lack neither records of sent 
messages nor clarity of purpose. Thus, the additional require-
ments should be eliminated for messages as soon as possible, 
but may remain for some time for other features of social net-
working websites.
This prediction and recommendation, especially with 
respect to messages, is not to say that social networking websites 
will be regularly entered into evidence at trial. Rather, authenti-
cation is only the first step for the message, posting, photograph, 
or other proffered evidence from a social networking website. 
Like all other types of evidence, even once ESI—including ESI 
Although it seems inevitable 
that parties will eventually seek 
to enter such tags as evidence, 
it seems unlikely that courts 
will jump through each of these 
hoops to authenticate such a tag 
on a social networking website 
because it would take too much 
time and energy for very little 
probative value.
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from social networking websites—makes it past the low thresh-
old of information required for authentication, it is still subject to 
a number of other evidentiary hurdles, including hearsay,241 the 
best evidence rule,242 Rule 403,243 Fourth Amendment problems 
related to how the information was obtained,244 and—at least 
in criminal cases when the information is being used against 
the defendant—the Confrontation Clause. Again, as evidence 
from social networking websites appears more frequently in 
the courtroom, courts’ approaches to evidentiary issues beyond 
authentication will become clear, which will affect whether 
parties actually try to use this type of evidence routinely.
Finally, even when appellate courts find in criminal cases 
that social networking website evidence was not sufficiently 
authenticated, the convictions remain intact. This is because 
courts often find that the admission of unauthenticated mes-
sages, postings, or photographs is merely harmless error.245 
Reversible error has been found only when the trial record 
is replete with the state’s references to and repeated reliance 
on the improperly authenticated evidence throughout the trial 
and especially during closing argument.246 Consequently, the 
fundamental effect of varying the authentication approaches to 
this type of evidence is unlikely to be a reversal of convictions 
or judgments.247 However, trends in the case law will serve to 
shape the case strategy of parties seeking to admit or exclude 
this type of evidence. For example, if courts continue to follow 
the security-driven approach to messages, parties will know 
that they must bring in an expert to enter the message into 
evidence.248 In contrast, if more courts follow the corroboration 
approach, parties will be forced to focus more on content and 
surrounding circumstances.249
So what does existing case law mean for the courts, for 
parties, and for users of social networking websites? Courts 
must be able to adapt to the fast-paced, ever-growing world of 
the internet. Surely courts cannot reinvent the wheel and create 
new tests for each different type of internet-produced piece of 
evidence proffered in every case. Instead, courts must maintain 
the flexibility intended by Rule 901, seeking to elicit a full 
picture of the evidence in a way that maintains fairness to all 
parties. Per the Griffin dissent, courts should accept this new 
category of evidence without hesitation; after all, it will only 
become more prevalent with time.250
Lawyers must come to court expecting a challenge, armed 
with the knowledge that in all likelihood, litigation is an 
opportunity to teach the court about social networking websites 
in a way that benefits their clients. Indeed, most of the cases that 
deemed proffered evidence inauthentic, provided parties with 
explicit instructions for next time, identifying for the propo-
nent of the evidence exactly what kind of information would 
be needed to authenticate the evidence. Most frequently, that 
information involves experts who can testify to the security 
settings of social networking websites or digital photography 
experts who can testify to whether or not a picture has been 
altered. Given such clear directions by many courts, failure to 
authenticate social networking evidence in those jurisdictions is 
truly an avoidable “self-inflicted injury”251—provided, of course, 
that the party can afford to hire such an expert. Case law on this 
issue will likely evolve over the next few years, albeit at a slower 
pace than the social networking websites themselves, and advo-
cates must stay up to date on changes in the law while applying 
it by analogy to whatever new features social networking 
websites create.
Finally, users of social networking sites must be aware of 
how their web presences are just a click away from becoming 
evidence. It would, perhaps, be too much to ask that Facebook, 
MySpace, and other social networking websites provide 
Miranda-like warnings or disclosure to their users, highlighting 
the fact that one’s online presence can be used against them in 
a court of law.252 Indeed, such a request stands in contrast to 
the purpose of such websites, which foster a forum for sharing 
information, not limiting it. Yet it is in the websites’ best inter-
ests to maintain long-term clients, and providing such advice 
may be perceived as well-intentioned, helpful alerts. Certainly a 
user would prefer a warning, in lieu of having his own Facebook 
post used against him at trial.
This type of evidence will likely make its way into the 
courtroom more frequently over the next few years, as the courts 
become more familiar with social networking websites and 
especially as a younger generation of lawyers and clients, 
constant users of such sites, become parties. Indeed, social 
networking evidence in the courtroom is already making 
national headlines in pre-trial proceedings against George 
Zimmerman, who was charged with second-degree murder of 
teenager Trayvon Martin in 2012.253 Because of its publicity, 
Zimmerman’s trial is likely to serve as a touchstone for the use 
of this type of evidence in criminal trials. Until more jurisdic-
tions, including the Florida county circuit court presiding over 
George Zimmernan’s trial,254 address these issues head on, parties 
must be prepared to meet the heightened bar that some courts have 
set thus far, requiring specific information about security settings 
and photography technology. While a heightened bar may well 
be appropriate for posts, tags, and whatever new functions are yet 
to come to social networking websites, with respect to messages 
sent from such sites there is simply no need to surpass the suf-
ficiency standard widely used for e-mail evidence today.
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